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Abstract. An assessment of the overall requirements to a Norwegian 
gamma-monitoring network is undertaken with special emphasis on 
the geographical distribution of automatic gamma monitoring sta-
tions, type of detectors in such stations and the sensitivity of the 
system in terms of ambient dose equivalent rate increments above 
the natural background levels. The study is based upon simplified 
deterministic calculations of the radiological consequences of ge-
neric nuclear accident scenarios. The density of gamma monitoring 
stations has been estimated from an analysis of the dispersion of ra-
dioactive materials over large distances using historical weather 
data; the minimum density is estimated from the requirement that a 
radioactive plume may not slip unnoticed in between stations of the 
monitoring network. The sensitivity of the gamma monitoring sys-
tem is obtained from the condition that events that may require pro-
tective intervention measures should be detected by the system. Ac-
tion levels for possible introduction of sheltering and precautionary 
foodstuff restrictions are derived in terms of ambient dose equiva-
lent rate. For emergency situations where particulates contribute 
with only a small fraction of the total ambient dose equivalent rate 
from the plume, it is concluded that measurements of dose rate are 
sufficient to determine the need for sheltering; simple dose rate 
measurements however, are inadequate to determine the need for 
foodstuff restrictions and spectral measurements are required. 
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1 Introduction
In the event of a nuclear or radiation emergency resulting in the dispersion of
radioactive materials into the environment, the eﬀective implementation of mea-
sures for the protection of the public will largely depend upon the adequacy of
advance preparation. This should include the preparation of emergency response
plans to control and limit the consequences of the accident.
The IAEA has published requirements entitled Preparedness and Response for
a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency [1] in which it is required that operational
criteria be established for promptly assessing the results of environmental moni-
toring in order to implement eﬀective urgent and longer-term measures to protect
the public against the exposure to radionuclides released to the environment by a
nuclear or radiological accident. In accordance with these requirements and also
from the experience gained in most of the European countries aﬀected by the
Chernobyl accident many IAEA Member States have established a network of
monitoring stations to detect a passing radioactive plume released to the atmo-
sphere by an accident at a nuclear facility.
In Norway such a network of monitoring stations has been in operation for
many years. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) has in a
“Request for Proposal - Modernization of the automatic gamma monitoring sys-
tem in Norway” [2] called for an assessment of the overall requirements for a
national Norwegian monitoring network with special emphasis on the geograph-
ical distribution of monitoring stations, type of detectors in such stations and
the sensitivity of the system in terms of dose rate increments relating to speciﬁc
countermeasures.
1.1 Background
The purpose of an automatic gamma monitoring system is to provide early warning
of nuclear accidents and/or to provide a ﬁrst, rough assessment of the radiological
situation with the purpose of introducing protective measures in the early (emer-
gency) phase of a nuclear accident. The present study presents the rationale for a
distributed network of automatic gamma monitoring stations in Norway. The ma-
jor issues considered in the study are (1) type of gamma monitors, (2) sensitivity
of these monitors in terms of the minimum detectable incremental dose rate level
related to international recommended intervention levels, and (3) the spatial den-
sity of gamma monitoring stations required to comply with the rationale behind
the monitoring network, with special emphasis on nuclear power plants in neigh-
bouring countries. The potential for early information on accidental dispersion of
anthropogenic radioactivity will in part be limited by political/economical con-
straints imposed on the monitoring system; a quantiﬁcation of these aspects will,
however, be outside the scope of this study.
A nuclear accident is normally divided into three phases: a pre-release phase
with a time scale of hours/days, a release phase with a time scale of hours/days
and a post-release phase with a time scale of weeks/months/years, depending on
the nature of the release. Protective measures to be taken with the purpose of
averting radiation exposure from atmospheric releases of radioactive materials are
often divided into preventive, urgent and late protective measures, relating to the
three phases of the accident as indicated in Fig. 1. Automatic gamma monitor-
ing stations are normally justiﬁed only for warning and assessment purposes in
the emergency phase of an accident and not as basis for post-emergency coun-
termeasures because in this phase a reasonably complete picture of radiation and
contamination levels in the environment will be available based on more extensive
mobile survey measurements and environmental sampling and analyses.
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Figure 1. Time phases for introduction of protective measures in a nuclear ac-
cident. In the pre-release phase countermeasures are introduced based on plant
conditions. In the release phase countermeasures are introduced based on mea-
surements and plant conditions. In the post-release phase countermeasures and
recovery operations are introduced based on measurements.
1.2 Method of investigation
The purpose of the present study has been twofold, namely to determine the sen-
sitivity of a gamma monitoring system in radiological situations that may require
speciﬁc early phase countermeasures and to determine the geographical density
of such a system. The study has been based upon simpliﬁed deterministic calcu-
lations of the radiological consequences of generic nuclear accident scenarios. A
more comprehensive study would have required a probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA).
Two release scenarios are considered in the study: (1) a noble gas release with
a minor content of iodine and (2) a release of noble gases, iodine and particulates.
A decay time during transport is assumed to be 24 hours corresponding to a
distance from the release point to the point of detection of 200 - 1,000 kilometres,
depending on wind speed. The plume passage time is assumed to be 4 hours.
An “order-of-magnitude” assessment has been made of the possible (minimum)
external gamma dose rates that can be measured by an automatic gamma measur-
ing system given a radiological situation that calls for one or more speciﬁc urgent
countermeasures in the emergency phase. Rather inexpensive urgent countermea-
sures are sheltering and precautionary foodstuﬀ restrictions. The doses averted
from these urgent protective measures can be assessed from measurements of the
ambient dose equivalent rate from the plume and activity deposited on the ground
(gross gamma dose rate) and from measurements of the surface contamination
density on ground and its nuclide composition (gamma spectrometry).
The minimum density of gamma monitoring stations has been estimated from
an analysis of the dispersion of radioactive materials over large distances. For
this investigation calculations with the RIMPUFF atmospheric dispersion/dose
model using historical weather data have been performed [3], and requirements
to the density of gamma monitoring stations have been estimated based on the
assumption, that the radioactive cloud may not slip unnoticed in between stations
of the monitoring network.
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1.3 Existing system
The existing Norwegian automatic monitoring system has been established to de-
tect potential radioactive releases from foreign or domestic sources. These include
nuclear power plants in surrounding countries, the nuclear reactors at Halden and
Kjeller, and nuclear-powered vessels [4].
The gamma-monitoring network comprises 28 monitoring stations, 11 of which
being equipped with Reuter-Stokes ionization chamber detectors while 18 stations
have NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors with multi-channel analyzers for gamma spec-
trometry. For both systems an alarm level is set at 40 nSv·h−1 increase in the
total gamma dose rate (ambient dose equivalent rate). In addition, alarm crite-
ria for the gamma spectrometers are applied for an increase in the radiation level
within either of the 131I, 134Cs, and 137Cs energy windows.
In addition to the gamma-monitoring network, the emergency monitoring pro-
gram includes high- and low-volume air-monitoring stations, capabilities for mobile
survey measurements, airborne measurements, analyses of foodstuﬀs and environ-
mental samples, and for contamination measurements [4].
2 Rationale of a national gamma monito-
ring network
Because of the need to act quickly in case of a nuclear or a radiological emergency,
there is merit in establishing - in advance - values of surrogate quantities for doses
that could be averted by diﬀerent countermeasures. Such operational quantities
can be more readily assessed from conditions pertaining when decisions need to be
made, e.g. expressed as ambient dose equivalent rates, which could be measured
at a network of monitoring stations distributed within the country in a grid with
a density determined by pre-selected accident or threat scenarios [5].
2.1 Objectives of an automatic gamma monitoring system
Urgent countermeasures in the emergency phase of a nuclear accident can be
triggered before activity concentrations or dose rates can be measured in the
environment. The basis for such measures would be plant conditions, e.g. measured
activity concentration or dose rate within the containment and the probability of a
release from the containment to environment [6]. Urgent countermeasures can also
be triggered by environmental measurements of gamma dose rates, e.g. obtained
from the automatic monitoring network.
Doses from activity released into the environment can be averted by speciﬁc
countermeasures, but avertable doses are not a measurable quantity. Measure-
ments in the environment of external dose rates and gross activity concentrations
in air combined with model calculations of doses can, however, predict avertable
doses by a given urgent countermeasure. Automatic monitoring systems are there-
fore useful in the emergency phase of an accident, both as a warning system (alarm)
and as a tool to predict doses to the aﬀected population (assessment).
The objectives of a system of national automatic gamma measuring stations
are shown schematically in Fig. 2. It appears from the ﬁgure that if a radioactive
plume passes a measuring station, an alarm relating to a speciﬁc countermea-
sure or a combination of countermeasures can be triggered; the “alarm branch”.
Precautionary countermeasures may or may not be invoked, depending on other
information that may be available in the situation. Further (mobile) measurements
may be initiated in order to assess the situation.
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Figure 2. Flow chart showing the procedures following an alarm from the proposed
automatic gamma monitoring system at Norwegian territory.
In the assessment branch, the severity of a radiological situation is assessed, either
based directly (solely) on data from the automatic monitoring network by com-
paring with predeﬁned, optimized operational intervention levels (OILs) [5, 7], or
through a data assimilation process where various data, e.g. from mobile measure-
ments, are combined to assess the situation [8, 9]. The assessment process may be
initiated by an alarm, or may be carried out automatically, not depending on an
initial alarm.
Since the authorities will have an interest in acquiring information on the disper-
sion of anthropogenic radionuclides in the environment, the alarm level from this
perspective should be set as low as possible, limited only by technical/economical
constraints. These constraints constitute a lower limit to the sensitivity (detection
limit) of the monitoring system. In setting the alarm level, it is, however, impor-
tant that false alarms, e.g. due to natural variations in the background level, are
kept at a minimum. An upper limit to the sensitivity is obtained by requiring that
events that may necessitate protective intervention measures should be detected.
This upper limit is determined by the action level for the countermeasure. Hence,
the dose rate detection limit(s) of the system should be better than the action
level associated with the possible onset of protective countermeasures.
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2.2 Threat scenarios
Despite all the precautions that are taken in the design and operation of nuclear
facilities and the conduct of nuclear activities, there remains a possibility that
a failure or an accident may give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency. In
some cases, this may give rise to the release of radioactive materials within facilities
and/or into the public domain, which may necessitate emergency response actions.
Adequate preparations should be established and maintained at local and national
levels and, where agreed between States, at the international level to respond to
emergencies.
According to the IAEA, the nature and extent of emergency arrangements
should be commensurate with the potential magnitude and nature of the threat
associated with the facility or activity [1]. Any threat associated with nuclear fa-
cilities in nearby States should also be considered. In the threat assessment, any
populations at risk should be identiﬁed and, to the extent practicable, the like-
lihood, nature and magnitude of the various radiation related threats should be
considered. Facilities, sources, practices, on-site areas, oﬀ-site areas and locations
should be identiﬁed for which a nuclear or radiological emergency could warrant
precautionary urgent protective actions to prevent severe deterministic health ef-
fects, urgent protective actions to reduce stochastic eﬀects by averting doses, and
agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures to ingestion and longer term pro-
tective measures.
The following four threat scenarios have been considered by the NRPA as the
main nuclear or radiological threats in relation to a Norwegian automatic gamma
monitoring system:
(1) accidents at nuclear power reactors
(2) accidents involving nuclear powered vessels
(3) accidents at a Norwegian research reactor
(4) terrorist activities
The four threat scenarios pose diﬀerent requirements to a monitoring system.
However, a reasonably sparse national automatic gamma-monitoring network
may only eﬀectively address the ﬁrst of these threat scenarios, while the remain-
ing three scenarios require either a much denser network and/or the existence of
an operational mobile monitoring system to allow for local mapping of aﬀected
territory, including monitoring for pure beta-emitters.
(1) Accidents at nuclear power reactors outside Norway
A number of nuclear power plants are situated in the neighbouring countries to
Norway as shown in Fig. 3. The minimum distance from the Norwegian bor-
der/coastline to these plants ranges from about 200 to 1,000 kilometres. The reac-
tors are of diﬀerent types and design and the potential threat from the plants also
diﬀer due to the diﬀerences in safety systems of the plants, e.g. lack of pressure
vessel at the nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union, cf. Table 1, below.
The threat posed by the diﬀerent power plants depend both on the risk for
accidents with releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere and on the di-
stance from Norwegian territory. The RBMK-type power plants at Ignalina and
Leningrad are considered to have a have a higher probability of accidents where
radioactive materials are dispersed into the atmosphere than the light water or
gas-cooled reactors of Finland, Sweden, UK and Germany. This is to some extent
balanced by the smaller risk associated with atmospheric dispersion over large
distances [10].
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Automatic gamma monitoring stations placed on Norwegian territory in a pro-
per network can address the threat scenarios from the nuclear power reactors
outside Norway.
Figure 3. Position of nuclear power plants outside Norway with the distance from
the Norwegian border or coast line in kilometres.
(2) Nuclear powered vessels
Reactor accidents may occur at nuclear-powered vessels, e.g. submarines or
nuclear-powered icebreakers with releases of radioactive material to the atmo-
sphere. Historically, a large number of accidents have occurred in nuclear powered
vessels, especially submarines of the Soviet (Russian) Navy. The frequency of ac-
cidents has, however, been decreasing since the early 1960’es, partly because of a
decreasing number of submarines of the navy, and partly because of a more safe
design of the newer classes of submarines [11].
Two types of accidents are of relevance for radioactive releases to the atmo-
sphere: criticality accidents and loss of cooling accidents (LOCA). The Soviet
Navy has suﬀered ﬁve criticality accidents in the past during refuelling or re-
pair/testing at the naval shipyards, and six LOCA while the ships were at sea.
In addition, a few coolant solidiﬁcation accidents have occurred that might have
lead to a LOCA [11].
Criticality accidents are unlikely to occur during normal operation, while neu-
tron ﬂux monitors and control systems are in operation, but they may happen
during refuelling or maintenance while the safety systems have been shut oﬀ. Dur-
ing refuelling the submarine hull is cut open and a criticality accident will result
in a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. Especially during de-fuelling when
used fuel is present, a criticality accident could result in a release of large amounts
of activity. LOCAs may occur, e.g. when the core cooling is reduced because of
a coolant leakage. They occur in particular during reactor operation or shortly
after reactor shutdown, when the decay heat still is signiﬁcant. If the fuel is dam-
aged during a LOCA, radioactive materials may be dispersed inside the reactor
compartment and the vessel.
In design of an early warning system for accidents at nuclear-powered vessels,
two important factors to be considered are the likelihood and the severity of an ac-
10 Risø-R-1514(EN)
cident, and the location of the accident, i.e. the distance from Norwegian territory.
Criticality accidents are unlikely to occur except when the vessels is undergoing
refuelling or maintenance at a shipyard, and in this respect, the nuclear-powered
vessel can be considered a stationary potential source. LOCAs in nuclear-powered
vessels may occur at sea, but the source term is unlikely to be signiﬁcant and to
pose a threat to Norwegian territory, the only possible exception being accidents
in one of the small number of nuclear-powered surface vessels.
Automatic gamma monitoring stations placed on Norwegian territory may ad-
dress criticality accidents, but may not eﬀectively address LOCAs.
(3) Accident at a Norwegian reactor
Accidents can occur on the two research/isotope producing reactors placed at
Norwegian research establishments. Although a national automatic gamma-
monitoring network may detect an accidental release of radionuclides from these
reactors, local emergency arrangements and detection systems would be signiﬁ-
cantly more eﬃcient to reveal such an accident. Therefore, a national automatic
gamma monitoring system should not be based on the threat scenarios from Nor-
wegian research reactors.
(4) Terrorist activities
Scenarios for breaching the security of a source with the malevolent intent of caus-
ing radiation exposure are characterized in terms of their threat, a term that is
widely used to describe a variety of security risks that may confront facilities
housing nuclear and other radioactive substances. To respond eﬀectively to possi-
ble security breaches, it is necessary to recognize and anticipate the kind of threat
that might trigger such an event. Possible scenarios include:
• detonation of conventional explosives shrouding an ordinary radioactive
source, such as those commonly used in medicine and industry, whose se-
curity has been breached
• contaminating a speciﬁc site or environment with radioactive materials where
the principal aim is the long-term loss of a site such as a railway station, bus
terminal, ﬁnancial district, or other key infrastructure facility
• contaminating food or water supplies with unsecured radioactive materials
where the aims are to expose the public consuming the contaminated food or
drink the contaminated water; and stop food or water supplies to the public
• attack on or sabotage of safety-related systems at nuclear facilities holding
large inventories of radioactive materials; this type of facilities encompass
nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants and
radioactive waste management installations
• diversion of nuclear materials, particularly special ﬁssionable materials, such
as 235U and 239Pu, and the development, construction and use of a crude
nuclear weapon, usually known as an ‘improvised nuclear device’
The scenarios are, however, completely diﬀerent in threat, genesis and likelihood
but they are rather similar in their ultimate consequence, namely unexpected sit-
uations of uncontrolled public radiation exposure and radioactive contamination
of the environment. The common element is the intent to generate terror by dis-
persing radioactive substances in public areas. There is therefore a common need
to be able to promptly assess and communicate the consequences of any event.
No single event can be used as a basis for development of response plans. An au-
tomatic gamma monitoring system would therefore not be adequate to detect a
“radiological attack”.
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3 Density of gamma monitoring network
3.1 Method of investigation
In deciding on the density of monitoring stations, the likelihood of detecting an-
thropogenic radioactivity in the environment with the purpose of reducing the
adverse eﬀects of radiation should be balanced against the costs of setting up and
operating the network. Modelling the likelihood of detection will be subject to un-
certainty. The likelihood of detection depends both on the spatial and temporal
extension and on the variability of the radioactive contamination. However, the
likelihood will increase as the density of the monitoring network is increased, until
the distance between monitoring stations are comparable to the spatial extension
of the radioactive contamination. For a non-uniform, fractal distribution of the
contamination it is further important for the detection probability that the sum
of the fractal dimensions of the network and the radioactive plume is larger than
two [12].
Considering radioactive releases that are transported towards the Norwegian
border from abroad, the distance between monitoring stations located at the bor-
der should be compared to the linear extension of the plume, in the transverse
direction of the mean advection direction from the release point. When the dis-
tance between stations is comparable to the linear, transverse extension of the
plume, adding more stations will not signiﬁcantly improve the likelihood of de-
tecting the plume.
For a more detailed assessment, e.g. for a rough mapping, of the spatial and
temporal distribution of a radioactive contamination a larger density of monitor-
ing stations is required. In principle, the distance between monitors should for
this purpose be small compared to the linear scale of variation of the contamina-
tion ﬁeld. While such a dense network can be established for monitoring in the
close neighbourhood of a potential nuclear accident source, e.g. for oﬀ-site mon-
itoring around the research/isotope producing reactors at Halden and Kjeller, it
will be a much more demanding task for widespread nuclear threats, such as those
associated with the nuclear power plants in the countries surrounding Norway.
In the following, only potential nuclear threats from locations in neighbouring
countries, for which the long-range atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materi-
als may aﬀect Norwegian territory, are considered. The likelihood that a national
network of automatic gamma monitoring stations located at or close to the Nor-
wegian border will detect the radioactive plume will depend on the transverse
extension of the plume as it reaches the Norwegian border.
3.2 Atmospheric dispersion
The transverse extension of the plume has been examined by performing a large
number of calculations with the RIMPUFF atmospheric dispersion model [3],
using historical weather data [13]. The eﬀective transverse extension depends both
on the size of each released puﬀ, which grows as function of the travel time, on the
initial dispersion at the source as well as on the duration of the release and the
monitoring time (averaging time). Because of wind shear, a large vertical extension
of the plume will aﬀect the horizontal, transverse plume size.
A short release time (and monitoring time) implies a narrower plume. Hence
a lower limit for the plume transverse extension is obtained for an instantaneous
release with little initial dispersion. On the other hand, considering the distance
from the Norwegian border to the major nuclear installations in surrounding coun-
tries, cf. Fig. 3, only reasonably large accidents may have a substantial eﬀect on
Norwegian territory. A large accident at a nuclear power plant, with core damage
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and release of radioactive material to the atmosphere, will have a minimum dura-
tion of maybe a few hours, before the release can be contained. The upper limit
of the release duration could be several days, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl
accident [14]. For the present investigation the duration of the release is assumed
to be 4 hours.
Using numerical weather prediction model data for the year 2004, a radioactive
plume released at a hypothetical reactor position was followed for 48 hours and
the time-integrated activity concentration in air was calculated. The width of the
plume, deﬁned as the root mean square angular dispersion at a ﬁxed radius was
calculated at distances up to 800 km from the release point. In total, approx. 300
such calculations were performed spanning the year 2004, to cover the variation
in weather patterns during the year. Details of the numerical investigations are
provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 4. Plume r.m.s. transverse extension (σ) as function of distance R from
the release site.
In Fig. 6 (Appendix A) the distribution of plume widths are shown for distances
200 - 800 km from the release site, and in Fig. 4 the median and the ﬁrst and
third quartiles of the distribution are shown. While the width of each plume may
display an irregular dependency on the distance, the typical widths inferred from
the distribution shown in Fig. 4 are seen to increase roughly as a square root of
the distance, consistent with a diﬀusing cloud.
The median plume width (1σ) at distances given by the closest distances from
the Norwegian border/coastline to nuclear power plants outside Norway are listed
in Table 1, cf. Fig. 3, using the simple parameterization of the distance dependency
given in Appendix A. Note, however, that reasonably conservative assumptions
have been made in deﬁning the release scenario.
Assuming a Gaussian shape of the crosswind plume proﬁle and a plume width
given by the median value the minimum measured dose rate at monitoring sta-
tions separated by, e.g. 4σ will be exp(−2) ≈ 0.14 relative to the maximum value
observed at the plume centreline. However, a much more irregular shape than the
smooth Gaussian proﬁle should be expected from the turbulent, long-range atmo-
spheric dispersion. This will add to the variability and may reduce the probability
of detecting the radioactive plume. A quantiﬁcation of these aspects has not been
carried out in this study.
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Table 1. Selected nuclear power plants in surrounding countries, with distances
from the Norwegian border. The last column shows the median transverse extension
of the plume (1σ) at the border, assuming the radioactive plume to reach Norway
at the position of the shortest distance from the power plant.
Nuclear power Reactor type Power plant Distance from Median r.m.s.
plant position Norwegian border plume width
Ringhals BWR, PWR 57o 15’ N, 12o 05’ E 185 km 15 km
Kola VVER 67o 30’ N, 31o 30’ E 200 km 16 km
Forsmark BWR 60o 25’ N, 18o 10’ E 305 km 20 km
Olkiluoto BWR 61o 10’ N, 21o 30’ E 465 km 24 km
Brunsbu¨ttel BWR 53o 54’ N, 09o 12’ E 473 km 25 km
Torness PT AGR 55o 55’ N, 02o 15’W 565 km 27 km
Hartlepool AGR 54o 40’ N, 01o 15’W 615 km 28 km
Lovisa VVER 60o 30’ N, 26o 10’ E 725 km 30 km
Ignalina RBMK 55o 20’ N, 26o 10’ E 965 km 35 km
Leningrad RBMK 59o 55’ N, 30o 25’ E 975 km 35 km
4 Sensitivity of gamma monitoring system
An upper limit to the sensitivity of the automatic gamma monitoring system
is obtained by requiring that nuclear accidents that may necessitate protective
actions to be taken in Norway should be detected by the system. It is assumed
that the accidents involve atmospheric releases of radioactive materials, which
are transported towards Norwegian territory from abroad. The relevant protective
actions in the emergency phase include sheltering, iodine prophylaxis and foodstuﬀ
restrictions.
The monitoring network may include dose rate meters recording increments in
the ambient dose equivalent rate or a similar quantity, and gamma spectrometers
from which the dose rate in radionuclide-speciﬁc energy windows and/or radionu-
clide activity concentration in air can be estimated, e.g. assuming a semi-inﬁnite
distribution of radionuclides in air.
4.1 Detection limits
In general, remedial actions should be taken if the averted dose by the action
oﬀsets the total costs of intervention. To aid emergency planning, generic opti-
mized interventions levels for speciﬁc protective actions have been recommended
by IAEA, cf. Table 2 [15]. A protective action should be invoked if the avertable,
eﬀective dose to a sample of the population exceeds the intervention level for the
action, i.e. for ∆E > ∆EIL.
Table 2. IAEA recommended generic intervention levels for urgent protective mea-
sures expressed in terms of avertable individual doses [15, 16].
Protective action Generic intervention level Comments
Sheltering 10 mSv averted Duration not to exceed 2 days
Evacuation 50 mSv averted Duration not to exceed 7 days
Iodine prophylaxis 100 mGy averted Dose to thyroid
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For foodstuﬀs, intervention levels (Guideline Levels) are deﬁned in terms of the
activity concentration of radionuclides in the foodstuﬀs, above which restrictions
on the use and distribution of the foodstuﬀs should be invoked, cf. Table 3.
Table 3. Guideline Levels for radionuclides in foods following accidental nuclear
contamination for use in international trade from the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission [17].
GUIDELINE LEVELS FOR FOODSTUFFS
Recommended values
(Bq/kg)
Radionuclides Foods destined for Milk and infants food
general consumption
134Cs, 137Cs, 103Ru, 106Ru, 89Sr 1,000 1,000
131I 100
90Sr 100
241Am, 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 242Pu 10 1
Considering all possible accident scenarios, characterized by the release, atmo-
spheric transport and deposition, radiation exposure pathways as well as the af-
fected population, both the dose averted by the remedial action, ∆E, and the
gamma radiation dose rate, E˙γ(x), detected by a monitoring station at location
x, are associated with large variability and should be treated as stochastic vari-
ables. In Fig. 5, the joint distribution of avertable dose and measured dose rate is
shown schematically. Note that the avertable dose, ∆E, and the dose rate, E˙γ(x),
may refer to two diﬀerent locations: the ﬁrst being the location of the population
sample considered, while the latter being the location of the monitoring station.
Figure 5. Schematic drawing of joint distribution of observed gamma dose rate,
E˙γ(x), and the avertable dose, ∆E. The action level for dose rate is the minimum
dose rate for which the avertable dose is equal to the intervention level, ∆EIL.
An action level in terms of the measured dose rate can be deﬁned for any of the
monitoring stations as
E˙AL = min
{
E˙γ(x) |∆E = ∆EIL
}
(1)
From Fig. 5 it then follows, that situations where the measured dose rate is
smaller than the action level will not require intervention, i.e.
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E˙γ(x) < E˙AL ⇒ ∆E < ∆EIL (2)
If the sensitivity of the gamma monitoring system, in terms of detectable incre-
ments in dose rate above the background level, is better than the action level
given in Eq. (1), it follows that events that require intervention will be detected
by the monitoring system. Hence, the action level provides an upper limit to the
sensitivity (detection limit) of the monitoring system.
A somewhat less strict, but more practical deﬁnition of the action level is
E˙AL = ∆EIL min
{
E˙γ(x)
∆E
}
(3)
from which the relation (2) also follows. Here, the minimum is taken over all
scenarios, i.e. not only those for which ∆E = ∆EIL. In applying Eq. (3), however,
care should be taken only to consider accident and exposure pathway scenarios for
which it is conceivable that interventions are justiﬁed. Eqs. (1) and (3) apply to a
single monitoring station. For a grid of monitoring stations in a network, E˙γ(x) in
Eqs. (1) and (3) is the highest of the measured dose rates, assuming it is suﬃcient
that a single monitoring station registers an event. In the following, the action
level deﬁned in Eq. (3) will be used.
If the measured quantity is the dose rate within an energy window, registered
in gamma spectrometry, the deﬁnition in Eq. (3) still applies for E˙γ(x) now be-
ing the window-dose rate and the action level is deﬁned accordingly. However, the
sensitivity of detecting nuclide-speciﬁc dose rates will be less; in the following,
therefore, it is assumed that the monitoring system records the total gamma dose
rate (or the total count rate over all energies at a gamma spectrometer). Assump-
tions on the nuclide composition in the plume can always be used to assess the
dose rate contribution from speciﬁc radionuclides and thus the action level for a
nuclide-speciﬁc countermeasure like iodine prophylaxis.
4.2 Action levels for speciﬁc countermeasures
In the following action levels for sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions are evalu-
ated, based on the deﬁnition, Eq. (3). The method may readily be extended to
include other countermeasures, e.g. evacuation and iodine prophylaxis.
Sheltering
The generic optimized intervention level for sheltering is ∆EIL = 10 mSv, assum-
ing that sheltering will not last longer than two days, cf. Table 2. The gamma
dose rates recorded by the monitoring network may have contributions both from
the plume and from deposited material,
E˙γ(x) = E˙plume(x) + E˙ground(x) (4)
while the dose avertable by sheltering at a (diﬀerent) position y consists of the
external radiation dose and the inhalation dose,
∆E(y) = ∆Eplume(y) + ∆Eground(y) + ∆Einh(y) (5)
The action level for dose rate given in Eq. (3) is obtained by varying the dose rate
in Eq. (4) and the avertable dose in Eq. (5) over all the accident and exposure
pathway scenarios considered. The two quantities will be highly correlated; how-
ever, by taking the ratio of the dose rate to the avertable dose, a trivial scaling of
the severity of the accident, e.g. scaling the total released activity at the accident,
will have no eﬀect on the action level given in Eq. (3).
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Two release scenarios have been considered: (1) a noble gas release with a minor
content of iodine and (2) a release of noble gases, iodine and particulates. In both
cases, the plume passage time is assumed to be 4 hours. The travel time from the
release point to the point of detection is assumed to be 24 hours, corresponding to
a travel distance of the order of 200 - 1,000 km, implying that many of the short-
lived radionuclides have been reduced signiﬁcantly by decay during transport.
The maximum dose rate recorded by the gamma-monitoring network is arbitrary
assumed to be approximately 1/4 of the maximum dose rate in air at the plume
centreline. Details of the calculations are provided in Appendix B.
In Table 4, the action levels for sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions are shown
for the two scenarios.
Foodstuﬀ restrictions
In principle, a dose rate action level for foodstuﬀ restriction can be deﬁned simi-
larly to the action level for sheltering deﬁned in Eq. (3), by estimating the doses
avertable by e.g. imposing a ban on speciﬁed foodstuﬀs and comparing these
avertable doses to an optimized intervention level for the countermeasure. How-
ever, rather than avertable dose it is more practical to consider an intervention
level in terms of activity concentrations in foodstuﬀs.
Following the Codex Alimentarius guidelines [17], generic intervention levels,
c
(k)
IL , are deﬁned for the activity concentration of c
(k) =
∑(k)
i ci for radionuclides
“i” belonging to the group (k), cf. Table 3. Similarly to Eq. (3) the intervention
level for foodstuﬀ restrictions in terms of a measured dose rate E˙γ(x) is deﬁned
as
E˙AL = min
(k)
{
c
(k)
IL min
(
E˙γ(x)
c(k)
)}
(6)
where the ﬁrst minimum is taken over the diﬀerent radionuclide groups and the
second minimum is taken over the diﬀerent accident scenarios considered. As
for sheltering, if the maximum observed dose rate at the monitoring stations is
smaller than the action level deﬁned in Eq. (6), the radionuclide activity con-
centrations in food will not exceed the speciﬁed intervention levels (Bq kg−1) for
each radionuclide group, i.e.
E˙γ(x) < E˙IL ⇒
{
∀k : c(k) < c(k)IL
}
(7)
For foodstuﬀs, the possible activity concentrations will vary considerably, depend-
ing e.g. on the time of year and on the nature and amount of rainfall. Considering
the same two accident scenarios as for the sheltering countermeasure, action levels
for foodstuﬀ restrictions have been calculated; details of the calculation are given
in Appendix A.
Table 4. Action levels of dose rate for sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions.
Countermeasure Scenario (1) Scenario (2)
Sheltering 5,000 µSv h−1 70 µSv h−1
Foodstuﬀ restrictions:
beef 14,000 nSv h−1 20 nSv h−1
lamb 9,000 nSv h−1 3 nSv h−1
leafy vegetables 7 nSv h−1 0.3 nSv h−1
beef 5 nSv h−1 0.5 nSv h−1
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The results are shown in Table 4. In Scenario 1 transfer to foodstuﬀs only consists
of iodine; in Scenario 2 transfer to beef and lamb is dominated by caesium isotopes
while transfer of 131I determines the action levels for leafy vegetables and milk.
5 Results and conclusions
A main objective of a national automatic gamma monitoring system is to detect
anthropogenic radioactivity in the environment and to provide a ﬁrst assessment
on whether emergency measures are needed to protect the public against the
exposure of radionuclides.
According to IAEA requirements [1] default operational quantities should be es-
tablished for, e.g. (a) the results of environmental monitoring in order to decide on
or to adapt urgent protective actions to protect the public, and (b) environmen-
tal measurements and radionuclide concentrations in food in order to decide on
eﬀective agricultural countermeasures, including a restriction of the consumption,
distribution and sale of locally produced foods and agricultural produce.
A gamma monitoring system distributed nationwide is capable of detecting an
atmospheric plume released in an accident outside the borders of the country.
Diﬀerent monitoring systems can be used, e.g. high-pressure ionization chambers
and scintillation counters operated as a gamma spectrometer. The present study
has addressed issues on such gamma measuring systems with regards to:
- the sensitivity of the system to be used in an emergency situation that requires
urgent protective measures
- the geographical density (grid density) of the system within the country
Action levels expressed as the maximum ambient gamma dose equivalent rate
at any of the measuring stations below which an urgent countermeasure is not
needed have been calculated for sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions. It appears
from these calculations that for sheltering rather simple measuring systems, e.g.
a GM-system, can easily measure the action level for both scenarios selected,
namely 500 µSv h−1 for Scenario 1 (noble gas + iodine release) and 70 µSv h−1
for Scenario 2 (noble gas + iodine + particulate release).
Action levels for foodstuﬀ restrictions are more diverse when expressed as ambi-
ent dose equivalent rate. For Scenario 1, action levels for restricting the foodstuﬀs
beef and lamb can easily be measured with a simple dose rate system whereas
the action level for restricting leafy vegetables and milk (due to its content of
131I) hardly can be measured, even with a sophisticated dose rate measuring
system. Also for Scenario 2, where the foodstuﬀ contamination consists of sev-
eral radionuclides of caesium, iodine, strontium and ruthenium, simple dose rate
measurements would not be adequate to trigger foodstuﬀ restrictions apart from
maybe restrictions on beef. Therefore, in emergency situations where particulates
contribute with even a small fraction of the total activity concentration, supple-
mentary measurements are needed, e.g. gamma spectrometry to determine the
iodine and caesium content of the plume.
Action levels for other countermeasures can be determined from the same me-
thodology as for sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions. For evacuation the metho-
dology is exactly the same as for sheltering. For iodine prophylaxis information on
the relative plume activity concentration of 131I at the detector position and the
intervention level for iodine prophylaxis (100 mSv as avertable equivalent dose to
thyroid) is needed to derive the action level for iodine prophylaxis.
The geographical density of a network of measuring systems in Norway can
be determined from considerations concerning the plume width at the Norwegian
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border in case of a nuclear accident at each of the nuclear power plants in sur-
rounding countries. Accidents at plants close to the border will require a denser
network than accidents at power plants at more distant positions. For an accident
at the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania, assuming that the monitoring
stations are separated with a distance of about 150 kilometres, the minimum dose
rate measured at a monitoring station would be about 15% of the maximum dose
rate that could have been observed in the plume centreline at the same distance
from Ignalina (approximately 1000 kilometres). In this case, if the detector(s) at
the measuring stations have a (combined) sensitivity, which enables the station
to detect an incremental dose rate of about 10 - 20% of the existing background
dose rate, the maximum incremental dose rate in the plume centreline would have
been about equal to the existing background dose rate.
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Appendix
A Long-range atmospheric dispersion
The transverse extension of an atmospheric plume at large distances from the
location of the source is estimated with the RIMPUFF atmospheric dispersion
model. RIMPUFF is a puﬀ diﬀusion model developed for real-time simulations of
plume dispersion [3]. The puﬀ dispersion is controlled by local turbulence levels
and wind ﬁeld provided by a meteorological pre-processor, LSMC [18]. Meteoro-
logical data was taken from the HIRLAM numerical weather prediction model.
RIMPUFF calculates activity concentrations and gamma doses from radioactive
decay. For the present calculations, the time-integrated activity concentration in
surface air, ρ, is used as a measure of the plume growth.
A plume consisting of a 85Kr gas was released at position (54o 10’N, 23o 10’E).
At distances R = 200, 400, 600, and 800 km ρ(R, θ) is evaluated as a function
of the direction angle θ from the release point, and the root-mean-square angular
ﬂuctuation σ determined. The calculations were repeated approx. 300 times with
diﬀerent release times spanning the year 2004, to be representative for both the
seasonal variations as well as the variations associated with the time-of-day of the
release [13].
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Figure 6. Frequency of horizontal r.m.s. plume widths, transverse to the direction
from the release point to the point of observation.
Each release was taken as a ground release with no initial plume rise. The duration
of the release was 4 hours, considered a probable duration of a major release from
a PWR, while perhaps on the shorter side for major accident at a RBMK reactor.
The puﬀ dispersion and integration time was taken as 48 hours from the beginning
of the release. After 48 hours the majority of puﬀs had left the HIRLAM domain
used in the calculations while in some cases, e.g. because of the presence of low-
pressure systems, the krypton plume was still inside the 800 km radius circle.
The 48 hours however, was considered an upper time limit for detection of the
radioactive plume by an automatic gamma-monitoring network.
In Fig. 6 the frequency of plume widths recorded at distances 200 - 800 km
22 Risø-R-1514(EN)
from the release site is shown, and in Fig. 4 the quartiles of the distribution
of widths are shown as function of the distance. The widths are seen to grow
roughly as the square root of the distance from the release site. A simple param-
eterization of the median is
σ = 1.13R 0.5 km0.5 (A.1)
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B Action levels for sheltering and food-
stuﬀ restrictions
In this appendix, action levels in terms of measured dose rate are estimated for
sheltering and foodstuﬀ restrictions. The system of exposure pathways and the
symbols used are shown in Fig. 7. The model used for calculating the action levels
is available as a spreadsheet.
Figure 7. Atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides, with symbols shown for the
transport of radionuclides, observed gamma dose rates at automatic monitoring
stations, and the avertable external and internal doses.
B.1 Atmospheric dispersion and deposition
It is assumed that at large distances from the release site, the radioactive
plume attains a stationary form during plume passage, characterized by a shape
parameter, χ0, and a uniform radionuclide composition, so that the activity con-
centration of radionuclide “i” can be written
χ
i(r) = χ0(r) fi (B.1)
The shape parameter, χ0(r), is given by the total activity concentration in air
(Bqm−3) and is assumed to be time-independent during plume passage, while
fi (0 ≤ fi ≤ 1) is the relative concentration of the radionuclide.
For an accident where radioactive material is transported towards Norwegian
territory from abroad, the activity concentration in air will decrease with the dis-
tance from the release site because of physical decay, dilution and deposition.
Hence, the largest activity concentration in air, χ0,max, will be observed on the
border, at the plume centerline. The activity concentration at a monitoring sta-
tion located at the border will in generally be smaller by a factor α(x),
χ
0(x) = α(x)χ0,max 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (B.2)
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where α(x) depends on the distance from the plume centreline to the monitoring
station.
Activity on the ground builds up during plume passage because of dry
and wet deposition. For a constant dry deposition velocity, vd, wet scaveng-
ing coeﬃcient, Λ, and mixing layer height, H , the activity on the ground becomes,
qi(r, t) = χi(r) (vd + ΛH)×
{
t, t < T
T, t > T
(B.3)
where the radioactive material is assumed to be conﬁned within the atmospheric
mixing layer and the activity concentration to have a uniform vertical distribution.
Furthermore, it is assumed that depletion of activity from the plume during plume
passage can be ignored, which is valid for a short plume passage time, T .
Table 5. Radionuclides released from an RBMK-reactor in scenarios 1 and 2 and
the composition at the position of the gamma monitoring system. A transport
time of 24 hours is assumed for calculating the radionuclide composition at the
detectors.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Radionuclide Core content Release Composition Release Composition
[PBq] fraction at detector fraction at detector
[%] [%] [%] [%]
85Kr 34 100 0.6 100 0.6
87Kr 2,300 100 0.0 100 0.0
88Kr 3,200 100 0.17 100 0.17
89Sr 3,400 - - 0.1 0.06
90Sr 260 - - 0.1 0.005
103Ru 5,200 - - 0.1 0.09
106Ru 1,500 - - 0.1 0.03
131I 3,300 0.1 0.06 1 0.6
132Te 4,800 - - 1 0.7
133Xe 5,800 100 94.0 100 92.6
135Xe 1,700 100 5.1 100 5.0
134Cs 200 - - 1 0.04
136Cs 120 - - 1 0.02
137Cs 340 - - 1 0.06
Two release scenarios have been considered for an accident of a RBMK reactor.
In Scenario 1, only noble gases and a small fraction of iodine is release from the
reactor, while in Scenario 2, the release contains large amounts of aerosols. The
radionuclide inventory is taken from [19]. The relative concentrations of the most
important radionuclides are given in Table 5.
B.2 Activity transfer to foodstuﬀs
Deposited activity will be transferred to plants and food products, either via di-
rect deposition on the plant surface or indirectly, through root uptake of deposited
activity. Transfer to the plants varies strongly with time of deposition with max-
imum transfer to the plants during the growth season, where direct deposition is
the dominating pathway.
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The peak activity concentration in foodstuﬀs, ci,max, is proportional to the ac-
tivity concentration on the ground after plume passage,
ci,max = TFi qi(T ) (B.4)
where TFi (m2 kg−1) denotes the transfer factor of radionuclide “i” for the food-
stuﬀ considered. The activity concentration ci (Bq kg−1) will decrease over time,
with Eq. (B.4) giving the peak value. The total activity concentration in a food-
stuﬀ of a radionuclide group (k) is obtained by summing over all radionuclides in
the group, cf. Table 3,
c(k) =
(k)∑
i
ci =
(k)∑
i
TFi (vd + ΛH)i χi T (B.5)
where Eqs. (B.3 - B.4) have been used.
Table 6. Transfer factors in (m2 kg−1) for peak concentration in foodstuﬀs per
unit deposited activity. Activity is deposited on October 1. The transfer factors are
obtained with the ECOSYS model [20].
Radionuclide Beef Lamb Leafy vegetables Milk
89Sr 1.3·10−3 1.1·10−3 4.0·10−1 5.0·10−2
90Sr 2.0·10−3 1.7·10−3 4.0·10−1 8.0·10−3
103Ru 6.0·10−4 6.0·10−4 3.0·10−1 8.0·10−5
106Ru 1.1·10−3 9.0·10−4 4.0·10−1 1.1·10−4
131I 2.0·10−4 3.0·10−4 4.0·10−1 6.0·10−2
132Te 8.0·10−5 3.0·10−4 3.0·10−1 8.0·10−3
134Cs 9.0·10−2 5.0·10−1 4.0·10−1 7.0·10−2
136Cs 1.7·10−2 1.3·10−1 3.0·10−1 5.0·10−2
137Cs 8.0·10−2 5.0·10−1 4.0·10−1 7.0·10−2
B.3 Dose rates
Radiation from the plume and from deposited radioactive material on the ground
contribute to the external dose rate, while activity in the plume and on the
ground contribute to the inhalation and ingestion doses, respectively. Neglecting
external beta radiation, the eﬀective dose rate from external radiation comprises
external gamma dose rate from the plume,
E˙plume =
∑
i
χ
i e˙plume,i (B.6)
and external gamma dose rate from deposited material,
E˙ground(t) =
∑
i
qi(t) e˙ground,i (B.7)
The conversion factor e˙plume,i for external gamma dose rate from the plume is
estimated for semi-inﬁnite plume geometry, while the conversion factor for external
gamma dose rate from deposited activity is estimated for an inﬁnite plane surface
and an eﬀective relaxation depth of 3 mm, corresponding to fresh deposition on a
gravelled area [21].
The inhalation dose rate is obtained as,
E˙inh = I
∑
i
χ
i einh,i(50) (B.8)
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where I is the breathing rate (m3 s−1), and the conversion factor einh,i(50) is the
(50 year) committed eﬀective dose per unit intake of the radionuclide [16].
The dose conversion factors for external radiation and for inhalation doses are
shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Eﬀective dose conversion factors for external gamma radiation from a
semi-inﬁnite plume and an inﬁnite plane surface, and for inhalation.
Radionuclide e˙γ,plume e˙γ,ground einh(50)
[Svm3 Bq−1 s−1] [Svm2 Bq−1 s−1] [SvBq−1]
85Kr 1.4·10−16 - -
87Kr 2.0·10−14 - -
88Kr 5.7·10−14 - -
90Sr - - 1.6·10−7
103Ru 2.7·10−14 3.1·10−16 3.0·10−9
106Ru 1.1·10−14 1.4·10−16 6.6·10−8
131I 2.1·10−14 2.6·10−16 7.4·10−9
132Te 1.1·10−14 1.6·10−15 2.0·10−9
133Xe 1.9·10−15 - -
135Xe 1.3·10−14 - -
134Cs 8.5·10−14 1.0·10−15 2.0·10−8
136Cs 1.1·10−13 3.0·10−16 2.8·10−9
137Cs 3.1·10−14 3.9·10−16 3.9·10−8
B.4 Avertable doses
Sheltering during plume passage may reduce the external gamma doses from the
plume and from deposited activity on the ground and the inhalation dose. The
avertable dose by sheltering is obtained for the three pathways deﬁned in Eqs.
(B.6 - B.8),
∆E = ∆Eplume + ∆Eground + ∆Einh (B.9)
∆Eplume = (1− Lp)T
∑
i
χi e˙plume,i (B.10)
∆Eground = (1− Lg) T
2
2
∑
i
(vd + ΛH)i χi e˙ground,i (B.11)
∆Einh = (1− F )T I
∑
i
χ
i einh,i(50) (B.12)
where Lp (g) is the plume (ground) location factor, i.e. the ratio of indoor to
outdoor dose rate, and F is the corresponding building ﬁltration factor [22, 23].
B.5 Action levels
The total external gamma dose rate at the site of the monitoring station is ob-
tained from Eqs. (B.1 - B.3) and (B.6 - B.7),
E˙γ(x) = E˙plume(x) + E˙ground(x)
= χ0 α(x)
∑
i
fi
[
e˙plume,i + (vd + ΛH)i t e˙ground,i
]
t < T (B.13)
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To estimate the action levels for sheltering/foodstuﬀ intervention given by Eqs.
(3) and (6), the minimum of the ratio of external gamma dose rate given in Eq.
(B.13) to the avertable dose/activity concentration in foodstuﬀ will be used. For
sheltering the action level is given by,
E˙
AL
= ∆E
IL
×min


α(x)
∑
i
fi
[
e˙plume,i + (vd + ΛH)i t e˙ground,i
]
T
∑
i
fi
[
(1− Lp) e˙plume,i + (1− Lg)T2 (vd + ΛH)i e˙ground,i + (1− F ) I einh,i(50)
]


(B.14)
The external gamma dose rate and the avertable dose in Eq. (B.14) refer to the
monitoring station and the location for intervention, respectively; the minimum
of the ratio will be for a scenario with rainfall at the location for intervention but
with no rainfall at the monitoring station.
The minimum external gamma dose rate at a monitoring station occurs at
t = 0, before the start of deposition to the ground. For a given release scenario,
i.e. for ﬁxed relative radionuclide concentrations fi, the numerator and denomi-
nator become uncorrelated, and the action level for sheltering can be written,
E˙
AL
≈ ∆E
IL
×
αmin
∑
i
fi e˙plume,i
max
{
T
∑
i
fi
[
(1− Lp) e˙plume,i + (1 − Lg)T2 (vd + ΛH)i e˙ground,i + (1− F ) I einh,i(50)
]}
(B.15)
Similarly, for a ﬁxed release scenario the action level for foodstuﬀ restrictions is
obtained from Eqs. (6) and (B.5),
E˙AL = min
(k)


c(k)
IL
min


α
∑
i
fi e˙plume,i
T
(k)∑
i
fi TFi (vd + ΛH)i




≈
αmin
∑
i
fi e˙plume,i
Tmax (vd + ΛH)max
·min
(k)


c(k)
IL
(k)∑
i
fi TFi,max


(B.16)
where it has been assumed that the dry and wet deposition parameters are similar
for all depositing radionuclides.
B.6 Parameter values
The parameter used for estimating the action levels given in Eqs. (B.15) and
(B.16), are summarized in Table 8, where the intervals of typical parameter values
also are provided. The minimum/maximum parameter values used for the present
calculation of action levels correspond to the endpoints of the parameter intervals.
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In choosing the minimum/maximum parameter values for estimating the action
levels, care must be taken not to assume unreasonable small/large values, which
will lead to unrealistic small action levels. In principle, one may ascribe a prob-
ability density function to each parameter, and the parameter intervals in Table
8 then correspond to a given percentile of the parameter values. Outlying values
of the parameters will be associated with low probabilities, and by systematically
choosing outlying values one will compound small probabilities.
In a full probabilistic study the action levels can be deﬁned as a lower percentile
of the dose rates at the monitoring stations, and estimated from the joint prob-
ability distribution of all variable parameters, including the relative radionuclide
concentrations fi.
Table 8. Parameter values used for dose calculations.
Symbol Description Value
L Building location factor (plume, ground) 0.1 - 0.7
F Building location ﬁltration factor 0.2 - 0.5
I Breathing rate 2.3·10−4 m3 s−1
vd Dry deposition velocity 0.001 m s−1
Λ Wet deposition scavenging coeﬃcient 0.0001 s−1
H Mixing layer height 200 - 1000 m
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